Quantitative easing works: Lessons from the unique experience in Japan 2001-2006 by Girardin, Eric & Moussa, Zakaria
Quantitative easing works: Lessons from the unique
experience in Japan 2001-2006
Eric Girardin, Zakaria Moussa
To cite this version:
Eric Girardin, Zakaria Moussa. Quantitative easing works: Lessons from the unique experience
in Japan 2001-2006. 2010. <halshs-00459384>
HAL Id: halshs-00459384
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00459384
Submitted on 23 Feb 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
        GREQAM 
   Groupement de Recherche en Economie 
Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III 
 
Document de Travail 
         n°2010-02 
 
 
 
Quantitative easing works: 
Lessons from the unique experience in 
Japan 2001-2006 
 
 
 
Eric GIRARDIN 
Zakaria MOUSSA 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantitative easing works:
Lessons from the unique experience in Japan 2001-2006
Eric Girardin
Faculté de sciences Economiques, Université de la Méditerrannée, 14 avenue Jules Ferry, 13621 Aix en Provence, France, and GREQAM, 2 rue de la
Charité, 13002 Marseille, France.
Zakaria Moussa∗
Université de la Méditerranée and GREQAM, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2 rue de la Charité, 13002 Marseille, France.
Abstract
The current financial crisis has now led most major central banks to rely covertly or overtly on quantitative easing. The
unique Japanese experience of quantitative easing is the only experience which enables us to judge this therapy’s effec-
tiveness and the timing of the exit strategy. This paper provides a new empirical framework to examine the effectiveness
of Japanese monetary policy during the "lost" decade and quantify the effect of quantitative easing on Japan’s activity and
prices. We combine advantages of Markov-Switching VAR methodology with those of factor analysis to establish two
major findings. First, we show that the decisive change in regime occurred in two steps: it crept out from late 1995 and
established itself durably in February 1999. Second, we show for the first time that quantitative easing was able not only to
prevent further recession and deflation but also to provide considerable stimulation to both output and prices. If Japanese
experience is any guide the quantitative easing policy must be seen as a symptomatic treatment; it must be accompanied
with a dramatic restructuring in the financial framework. The exit from quantitative easing must be postponed and decided
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1. Introduction
The current financial crisis has now led most major central banks to rely covertly or overtly on quantitative
easing. The unique Japanese experience of quantitative easing is the only experience which enables us to judge this
therapy’s effectiveness and determine the appropriate timing of the exit strategy. It is widely believed that during the
"lost" decade in Japan, characterized both by stagnation and by deflation, monetary policy was all but impotent. Available
academic work concludes that quantitative easing, based on flooding banks with base money, did not manage to stimulate
activity or revive inflation. The empirical study of output and price effects of monetary policy using the workhorse in
macroeconomic time series analysis, i.e. VARs (vector auto-regressive models), has been a very intensive area of research
over the last decade (Sims et al. (1990), Sims and Zha (1998); Bagliano and Favero (1998)). Such work has usually
put a lot of emphasis on the interest rate and the money transmission channel. However, in the case of Japan, since this
traditional channel of monetary policy did not work any more, the transmission channels used by the QEMP to affect those
macroeconomic variables need to be specified. Two transmission channels for the quantitative easing policy have been
suggested. The first is the expectation channel, consisting of " policy duration" and "signaling effects", and the second is
the portfolio rebalancing channel. On the other hand, instabilities in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy are
very likely, particularly in the case of Japan. In a standard stochastic model, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) show that,
when inflation is lower than one per cent, non-linearities in the transmission process of monetary policy arise solely from the
presence of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Indeed, these effects become increasingly important for determining
the outcome of monetary policy in circumstances with such low inflation rates. On an empirical level, accounting for
regime shifts should be a major concern when examining the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. Our aim is
to investigate the potential structural changes in transmission mechanisms of Japanese monetary policy. We will therefore
allow for stochastic regime switching within a vector-autoregressive model.
Moreover, to conserve degrees of freedom, standard VARs rarely employ more than six to eight variables. This fact
is particularly important in the case of a Markov-Switching (MS) VAR model when the number of estimated parameters
rises very quickly if the number of variables is large or the lag length is long. Moreover, in reality policymakers work
with an information set which contains many data series. Bernanke et al. (2005) show that lack of information in the VAR
model leads to two related problems : (i) the less the central bank and private sector related information is reflected by
the analysis the more the policy shock measure is biased. This leads to puzzles which characterize the traditional VAR
model. (ii) impulse response functions are not sufficient to analyze the effects of monetary policy on general economic
concepts like real economic activity or investment, which cannot be represented by one variable only. Factor analysis
consists in summarizing a large number of data series to produce a small number of estimated factors. We suggest that a
combination of factor-augmented and Markov Switching VAR models could be powerful since it enables us at the same
time to introduce a realistic amount of information, keep the statistical advantages of using a parsimonious system, and take
into account possible structural changes. Moreover, following Belviso andMilani (2006), we also attribute a clear economic
interpretation to the factors, in a structural FAVAR (SFAVAR). Each estimated factor will represent one economic concept
namely ’Real activity’, ’Inflation’ and ’Interest rates’.
The combination of these methodologies in a so-called MS-SFAVAR model allows us to establish two major find-
ings. First we propose new empirical evidence supporting the ability of quantitative easing to provide stimulation to both
output and prices. Given the uncertainties surrounding the measurement of output and prices during the great stagnation,
using factor analysis to characterize these two macroeconomic concepts by summarizing a large number of variables errs
on the side of caution. Second, proposing the first Markov-switching analysis of a SFAVAR, we are able to show that the
decisive change in regime occurred in two steps: it crept out in late 1995 and established itself durably in 1999 around the
time when the BOJ implemented QEMP. The impulse responses in the second regime should thus describe precisely the
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effect of this non-conventional strategy on output and prices. In addition, by contrast with previous work using MS-VARs
(Fujiwara (2006)) non-neutrality of money and price divergence disappear with the MS-SFAVAR model. However, accord-
ing to the Japanese experience, if the quantitative easing can affect the symptoms it cannot affect the causes of the Japanese
disease such as the financial distress in the banking system and the excessive indebness of the corporate sector.
To conduct this analysis we will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents
some stylized facts on the Japanese economy and a brief review of the main transmission channels of QEMP. Next, the
MS-SFAVAR model is described in section 4. The following two sections examine data and estimation results and conduct
a range of robustness tests. Then Section 7 develops the implications of the paper’s main results for management by the
Fed of the global financial crisis generated by the burst of the United States housing bubble. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2. Related literature
Conclusions on the existence and the timing of the structural changes in Japanese monetary policy appear to
be particularly sensitive to : i) the methodology employed, ii) the variables taken into account, especially the choice of the
monetary policy instrument and iii) the period considered.
Kamada and Sugo (2006) adopt the VAR methodology to identify monetary policy shocks by imposing sign re-
striction on the impulse response functions. They use five variables, namely the CPI, industrial production, the nominal
exchange rate, 10-year JGB yields, and a monetary policy proxy. On the other hand the authors use the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) method to detect dates of possible structural changes between February 1978 and April 2005. The
detected structural change point corresponds to the peak of the asset price bubble in 1990 and results from a change in VAR
parameters. These authors show that during the post-bubble period the effect of monetary policy on prices and production
weakened. Miyao (2000) estimates a four-variable VAR. His monthly data for the call rate, industrial production, the mon-
etary base and the nominal effective exchange rates span the period between 1975 and 1998. The structural change point is
imposed exogenously in 1995 by including dummy variables. Such a treatment of structural change is criticized by Sims
and Zha (2006) who argue that structural changes must be treated endogenously where regimes are considered as stochastic
events.
Fujiwara (2006) uses theMarkov-switching methodology within a VAR framework (MS-VAR) with regime-dependent
impulse response functions (Ehrmann et al. (2003)). He examines the period between 1985 and 2003 by including three
and then four macroeconomic variables (industrial production, CPI, the monetary base and the 10-year JGB yield). This
model represents the advantage of detecting regime changes without imposing a priori constraints on the timing of such
changes. However, this analysis suffers from the non-neutrality of money and price divergence in the pre-stagnation regime.
Moreover it does not uncover any output or price effect of base money shocks during the Great stagnation.
In the spirit of Fujiwara (2006), Inoue and Okimoto (2008) employ a MSVAR model with five variables, namely
industrial production, the consumer price index, the monetary base, the call rate and the nominal effective exchange rate.
The data span the period between 1975 and 2002. The monetary base and the call rate both account for the monetary policy
instruments. Two regimes are identified. In the first regime the classical monetary instrument was effective until late 1995.
In the second regime which started in 1996, after the interest rate fell almost to zero, the effectiveness of interest rate shocks
collapsed. However, the monetary base in this regime has a positive and significant effect on output but a weak effect on
prices. Mehrotra (2009) uses three variables in the estimation of an MSVAR, specifically output, inflation rate and call
rate as a monetary instrument. Using data for the period between 1980 and 2003, he detects structural change in 1994.
Mehrotra (2009) finds that monetary policy still has a moderate impact on output in the second regime but the inflation
response displays a price puzzle and remains insignificant.
The common point of all these studies is that a limited set of variables is used in the analysis. In the present paper
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we apply the same methodology as Fujiwara (2006) and Inoue and Okimoto (2008) combined with factor analysis. The
MS-SFAVAR represents an improvement with respect to the standard MS-VAR model since it does not suffer from the
omitted-variable bias and allows a parsimonious system.
3. Quantitative Easing and its Transmission Channels
3.1. The Quantitative Easing Strategy
Since the beginning of the 1990s Japan has experienced a long slump in addition to a deflation activated
by the burst of the financial bubble. In order to try and get out of this crisis, the bank of Japan (BOJ) began to cut rates,
reducing the uncollateralized overnight call rate from 6 % in 1990 to 0.5 % in September 1995 and then maintained this rate
at such level up to September 1998. Despite several short recovery phases the economy began to deteriorate again in 1998.
The BOJ then successively decreased the call rate to a level very close to zero in 1999 and implemented the so-called Zero
Interest Rate Policy (henceforth ZIRP) between April 1999 and August 2000. This policy seemed to generate the expected
results ; the economy was recovering in mid-2000 and prices were stable. Therefore, the BOJ decided to stop the ZIRP in
August 2000. However, the economy weakened in late 2000; output began to decline and deflation worsened in 2001.
Under this economic environment the BOJ was pressured to adopt more aggressive monetary easing. The classical
monetary policy instrument (the overnight call rate) did not work any more because it was almost equal to zero and subject
to the non-negativity constraint on nominal short-term interest rates. Therefore, the BOJ decided to implement the so-
called Quantitative Monetary Easing Policy (henceforth QMEP) in March 2001. The monetary policy instrument was
thus changed to Current Account Balances (henceforth CAB) held by commercial banks with the Bank of Japan. The
QMEP consisted in providing ample liquidity using the CAB as the main operating policy target. Figure 1 shows that at
the introduction of QMEP the CAB increased to 5 trillion yen; a level 25% higher than the required reserve. The BOJ
gradually raised the target nine more times between March 2001 and December 2004 to 35 trillion yen which is the upper
target range. Over its five years of existence of the QMEP, excess reserves, which is the amount exceeding the required
reserves of around 5 trillion yen, averaged 26 trillion yen. Long-term government bonds were the main category of assets
bought to reach the quantitative target concerning current accounts1. Between August 2001 and October 2005 the amount of
outright purchases of JGB was raised from 200 billion yen to 1.2 trillion yen per month, to reach 63 trillion yen. The range
of assets bought by the BOJ was afterward widened to cover private assets held by private banks, asset-backed securities
and asset-backed commercial paper. The purchase of the latter implied that the central bank granted credit directly to small
and medium-sized firms.
3.2. Transmission Mechanisms of QEPM
Several factors limited the number of monetary policy transmission channels in Japan. First, because nomi-
nal interest rates were almost zero, real interest rates could only be affected by expected inflation. Consequently monetary
policy using the traditional channel of the short-term interest rate was inoperative. Second, the collapse of the Japanese
banking system prevented the activation of the credit channel. Indeed, bank lending declined during the period between
1999 and 2005 in spite of the ample liquidity provided to the banking system (Ito and Mishkin (2004)). Third, monetary
policy could influence prices through changes in the value of the domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. This
strategy, supported especially by Svensson (2003) was called the "foolproof way" to exit the deflation spiral. Monetary
authorities were skeptical about this strategy which was criticized by Ito and Mishkin (2004) with respect to its implemen-
tation. Indeed, due to the prevalence of floating exchange rates it was not easy for Japanese authorities to follow Svensson’s
1Maeda et al. (2005) provide an overview of the open market operations under the QEPM focusing on technical aspects.
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Figure 1. Current Account Balance Targets
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Note: The monetary authorities had a target of about 5 trillion yen when quantitative easing began in March 2001,
and a target of 6 trillion yen from August to December 2001. Such an increase in target corresponds to 20%. They
raised it by about 100% to 10-15 trillion yen range in December 2001. They then lifted it to the 15–20 trillion yen
range in March 2003 (40%) and the 30–35 trillion yen range in 2004 (11%). The legally required reserves during
this period were on the order of 5 trillion yen.
suggestion. On the other hand, the implementation of an exchange rate peg could be a source of confusion between the
nominal anchor, which is the price level, and the exchange rate. However, Ito and Mishkin (2004) and Ito and Yabu (2007)
suggest that the BOJ can intervene in the foreign exchange market without announcing an exchange rate target. This in-
tervention, being unsterilized, could help monetary authorities to gain credibility, sending a signal that the main objective
remains the price level. Moreover, Girardin and Lyons (2008) show that the intervention of the BOJ, even thought it is
fully sterilized through the issue of bonds, works through indirect channels. By means of a microstructure-based inter-
vention model they document that BOJ interventions worked indirectly both by coordinating private trades in the same
direction and damping the price impact of private traders. Therefore the hypothesis of exchange rate channel is valid but it
is beyond the scope of our study. The transmission channels of QMEP are usually classified in two groups2: expectation
effects, which consists of policy-duration and signaling effects, and portfolio-rebalancing effects. The expectation channel
is strictly connected to the commitment to maintain a zero interest rate until core CPI inflation becomes zero or positive
year-on-year. The policy-duration effect was suggested by Krugman (2000) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) in spite
of the fact that their two points of view differ on operational measures. Several empirical studies3 detect a significant effect
of policy-duration through a flattening of the yeild curve. Nonetheless, more recently Nakajima et al. (2009) show that
there is no evidence that this effect is transmitted to the real economy. Signaling effects are suggested by all of the three
courses of action included in the QEMP. However, the most pronounced signal sent by the BOJ to the private sector is when
it purchases long-term JGB’s. In other words, the BOJ makes the commitment constraining because it will incur a capital
loss when long-term interest rates increase. Surprisingly, Oda and Ueda (2007) detect a significant effect of this channel
2There are several possible way to classify transmission channels. See also Ugai (2007)
3See Oda and Ueda (2007) and Okina and Shiratsuka (2004)
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from the increase in CABs but no effect from the increase in the long-term JGB purchases. The potfolio-rebalancing chan-
nel can work directly when the BOJ alters its asset composition or indirectly through the mechanism whereby the monetary
base excess would lead the private sector to adjust its portfolio by buying financial non-monetary assets. Therefore, these
asset prices rise and yields accordingly decrease. Kimura and Ugai (2003) and Oda and Ueda (2007) show that the effect
of the rebalancing portfolio channel is insignificant or too small considering the extensive amount of the CAB expansion
and the JGB purchases.
The BOJ committed itself to maintaining this policy until inflation (measured by the CPI excluding perishables) is
stably positive. It predicted in March 2006 that inflation would remain positive and judged that the objective was reached
and that it was time to exit the QEMP. Consequently, the BOJ returned to the traditional instrument, the overnight interest
rate, as the operating target. Nevertheless, the efficacy of QEMP has not been definitively established empirically. We
suggest below to evaluate the effects of such a policy on the real economy through the channels just cited.
4. Methodology
Several criticisms addressed to the VAR approach concerning the identification of the effects of monetary policy
focus on the use of a restricted quantity of information. In order to conserve the degree of freedom, it is rare to use more
than eight variables in a classical VAR model.
Bernanke et al. (2005) show that the lack of information, from which the VAR approach traditionally suffers, leads
at least to two problems. First, taking into account only a small number of variables in the analysis biases the measures
of the monetary policy shocks. The best illustrations of this problem are the price, interest rate, liquidity and exchange
rate puzzles. Second, the impulse response functions are observed only for variables included in the model. The analysis
thus cannot be done on global economic concepts like economic activity or productivity, which cannot be represented by
a single variable. To remedy these problems, the authors proposed a combination between factor and VAR analysis. This
approach allows us to summarize a large amount of information in a limited number of factors which will be used in the
VAR model. Moreover, it avoids imprecision and possible biases in the estimates that arise from the fact that any one
observable may be a poor measure of the relevant underlying concept.
However, in Bernanke et al. (2005)’s paper the factors do not have an immediate economic interpretation. Following
Belviso and Milani (2006) we provide a structural interpretation to these factors. We seek to identify each factor as a basic
force that governs the economy as ‘real activity’, ‘price pressure’, ‘interest rates’ and so on. We follow this literature
and attempt to go a step further, seeking to take into account the possible existence of structural change in the monetary
transmission mechanism. We therefore propose a Markov switching vector autoregression augmented with economically
interpretable factors: we label this novel approach Markov Switching Structural Factor-Augmented VAR (MS-SFAVAR).
4.1. MS-SFAVAR
Let Xt and Yt be two vectors of economic variables, with dimensions (NX1) and (MX1), where t = 1,2, ...T is
a time index. Xt denotes the large dataset of economic variables and Yt denotes the monetary policy instrument controlled
by the central bank. We assume that variables in Xt are related to a vector Ft with (KX1) unobservable factors, as follows :
Xt = BFt + et (4.1)
where et are errors with mean zero assumed to be either weakly correlated or uncorrelated; these can be interpreted as the
idiosyncratic components. The (NXK) vector Λ represents the factor loadings.
We can think of unobservable factors in terms of concepts such as “economic activity” or “price pressure”. But here,
following Belviso and Milani (2006) we divide Xt into various categories X1t , X
2
t , ... X
I
t which represent various economic
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concepts, where X it is a (NiX1) vector and ∑iNi = N. Each category of X it is thus assumed to be represented by only one
element of F it which is a (KiX1) vector (∑iKi = K). That means that each variable in the vector X it is influenced by the state
of the economy only through the corresponding factors. Therefore, compared to the FAVAR model, the factors have more
meaningful structural interpretations. Hence we obtain :
X1t
X2t
. . .
X It
=

Λ f1 0 . . . 0
0 Λ f2 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 Λ fI


F1t
F2t
. . .
F It
+

e1t
e2t
. . .
eIt
 (4.2)
In this analysis we assume that each segment of X it can be explained by exactly one factor, that is Ki = 1 for all i. Also
assume that the dynamics of (Yt ,F1t ,F
2
t , ...,F
I
t ) is given by a factor-augmented autoregression (FAVAR):
F1t
F2t
. . .
F It
Yt

=Φ(L)

F1t−1
F2t−1
. . .
F It−1
Yt−1

+νt (4.3)
Consider the (M+ I)X1 dimensional vector Zt :
Zt
[
F1t F
2
t . . . F
I
t Yt
]
T (4.4)
A Markov-Switching structural factor-augmented VAR is represented by system (4.5). In its most popular version (Krolzig
(1997)), which we will use here, the regime-switching model is based on the assumption that the process st is a first-
order Markov process. Hamilton (1989), in his original specification, assumed that a change in regime corresponds to an
immediate one-time jump in the process mean. We rather consider the possibility that the mean would smoothly approach
a new level after the transition from one regime to another. We do it in an extension of Hamilton’s approach to a regime-
switching VAR system (Krolzig (1997)).
Zt =

α1+B11Zt−1+ . . . +Bp1Zt−p+A1ut i f st = 1
...
αm+B1mZt−1+ . . .+BpmZt−p+Amut i f st = m
(4.5)
Each regime is characterized by an intercept αi, autoregressive terms B1i, . . . ,Bpi and a variance-covariance matrix Ai. We
assume that m, the number of regimes, is equal to two. In this general specification all parameters are allowed to switch
between regimes according to a hidden Markov chain4. With Markov-switching heteroscedasticity, the variance of errors
can also differ between the two regimes. After the change in regime there is thus an immediate one-time jump in the variance
of errors. This model is based on the assumption of varying processes according to the state of the economy controlled by
the unobserved variable st . Here st = {1,2} is assumed to follow the discrete time and discrete state stochastic process of
a hidden Markov chain and governed by transition probabilities pi, j = Pr(st+1 = j|st = i), and ∑2j=1 pi j = 1∀i, j ∈ (1,2).
The conditional probabilities are collected into a transition matrix P as follows:.
p=
(
p11 p12
p21 p22
)
(4.6)
4In the terminology of Krolzig (1997) this specification is an MSIAH(m)-VAR(p) model.
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For a given parametric specification of the model, probabilities are assigned to the unobserved regimes conditional on the
available information set which constitutes an optimal inference on the latent state of the economy. We thus obtain the
probability of staying in a given regime when starting from that regime, as well as the probability of shifting to another
regime. The classification of regimes and the dating algorithm used imply that every observation in the sample is assigned
to one of the two regimes. We assign an observation to a specific regime when the smoothed probability of being in
that regime is higher than one half. The smoothed probability of being in a given regime is computed by using all the
observations in the sample.
4.2. Estimation
OurMS-SFAVAR approach retains the advantages of a FAVARmodel over a simple VAR.Moreover, it allows
us to take into account the instability of the monetary transmission mechanism. Factors estimated from the subset databases
are the unobserved variables that, with the policy instrument, enter the MS-VAR (equation 4.5). To estimate the factors,
the variables must be transformed to induce stationarity. By contrast the variables used in a VAR analysis do not need
to be stationary. In the tradition of Sims et al. (1990), the specification of a VAR system that we use considers variables
in levels5. In the case of such VARs with polynomial functions of time and one or more unit roots, Sims et al. (1990)
show that, independently of the order of integration of the variables, one can get a consistent estimation of coefficients.
An alternative route would consist in focusing on target variables such as the output gap rather than the level of output,
and inflation rather than the price level. However, both would raise problems. In the case of Japan, the output gap is a
loosely defined concept since there is much uncertainty as to the level of potential output (Kamada and Masuda (2001); and
Bayoumi (2001)). Similarly, focusing on the rate of inflation would not seem adequate when examining a period of overall
price stability. Mehrotra (2009) examines whether price-or inflation-targeting would be more adequate in the deflationary
environment experienced by the Japanese economy. As Mehrotra (2007) and (2009) argue, movements in the price level
seem to be the relevant variable of interest. All the more so, since the BOJ promised to keep its interest rate at zero
until the CPI stabilizes at zero, in which case there is neither inflation nor deflation. Moreover, Fujiwara (2006) provides
a succinct argument in support of a VAR estimation in level. He argues that the main purpose of a VAR analysis is to
examine the inter-relationship among variable rather than to determine parameter estimates. Differencing, therefore, could
miss important information about co-movement in the data. Consequently, we estimate model in levels using cumulated
factors6.
In this paper we consider a two-step approach to estimating 4.2-4.5. The first step consists in the estimation of the
factors and factor loadings. The second step is the estimation of the MS-VAR using the factors.
4.2.1. Factor estimation
The main approach used for the estimation of factors consists in principal component analysis. However, as
discussed by Belviso and Milani (2006), the factors thus estimated have unknown dynamic properties because principal
components do not exploit the dynamics of the factors or the dynamics of the idiosyncratic component. Two standard
principal approaches exploit these features to extract the static factors through dynamic principal components: the static
principal components method proposed by Stock and Watson (2002) and the Generalized Dynamic Factor Model (GDFM)
of Forni et al. (2005) that is a two-step approach based on dynamic principal components. The first approach is situated in
5Of course the cointegration relationship between variables was explored. Results of the VECM model in Appendix F show that there is no evidence
supporting the existence of long term relationships between production, price, long term interest rate and monetary base. This can be explained by the
fact that the money multiplier was no longer stable after 1990 and, as mentioned by Fujiwara (2006), there is a lack of evidence to support the presence
of a M2 velocity cointegrating relationship after 1985.
6Examine the graphs of MS-VAR residuals to find out whether the residuals are well behaved seems reasonable. Non-stationarity of variables therefore
does not impose problem with the estimation. In addition, by the means of bootstrap techniques we are able to have an interpretable statistic tests on
regression parameters.
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the time domain while the second is situated in the frequency domain. Both differ from static principal component analysis
in that they allow for a possibility of autocorrelation between idiosyncratic components. Nonetheless, there are two main
differences between Stock and Watson’s (2002) method and that of FHLR in the way they estimate the space spanned
by the factors. First, Stock and Watson’s (2002) approach estimates the factors using the standard principal components
based on a one-sided filter of the variables. But in the FHLR approach the common factors are estimated by exploiting
information about the degree of commonality between all variables, obtained from covariance matrices of common and
idiosyncratic components, estimated in a first step. Indeed, the variables are weighted according to their common and
idiosyncratic variances. The variables having the highest common/idiosyncratic variance ratio (commonality) are selected.
Since the weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the idiosyncratic components, this method provides more
efficient estimates of common factors.
For the MS-SFAVAR approach employed in this paper, static factors are estimated by using the GDFM of Forni
et al. (2005). Under the GDFM each variable can be written as the sum of two unobservable components:
xit = χit + εit = bi1(L) f1t +bi2(L) f2t + · · ·+biq(L) fqt + εit (4.7)
where χit is the common component and εt it the idiosyncratic component; bi1(L), · · · ,biq(L) (i = 0, · · · ,s) represent the
dynamic loadings of order s; f1t , · · · , fqt are the q dynamic factors. Equation 4.7 can be written in vector notation:
xit = χit + εt = B(L) fqt + εit = BFt + εt (4.8)
where Ft = ( f ′t , · · · , f ′t−s) an B= B(L). The number of static factors is equal to r = q(s+1).
As noted above, this approach is a two-step process7. First, it uses a frequency representation of the time series
proposed by Forni et al (2000a) to estimate the spectral density matrices of the common part ( ∑χn (θ),−pi ≤ θ < pi) and
of the idiosyncratic part (∑εn(θ)). Then, the covariance matrices of common and idiosyncratic components (Γ̂
χ
n0 and Γ̂
ε
n0
respectively) are obtained by using the inverse Fourier transforms of the respective spectral density matrices. Second,
by using estimated covariance matrices, eigenvalues and eigenvectors are estimated by solving the generalized principal
components problem:
Γχn0Vn j = Γ̂
ε
n0Vn jµn j
s.t.V ′n jΓ̂εn0Vn j = Ir
(4.9)
where the columns of the (n x r) matrix Vn j correspond to the eigenvectors and µn j is a diagonal matrix containing the first
largest eigenvalues of Γ̂χn0 and Γ̂
ε
n0 on its diagonal. The first generalized principal components are estimated as follows:
F̂ jnt =V
′
n jxnt (4.10)
The static factor loadings are defined as: [
(V ′n jΓ̂
T
n0)
−1
]′
V ′n j(Γ̂
χ
n0)
′ (4.11)
where Γ̂Tn0 = Γ̂
χ
n0+ Γ̂
ε
n0.
F̂ jnt are consistent estimates of the unknown common factors in equation 4.1.
4.2.2. MS-SFAVAR estimation
In the second step the model is estimated with the EM8 (Expectation–Maximization) algorithm. Estimated
factors are introduced in 4.5 instead of simple variables in a classical MS-VAR model.
7The representation theory of the dynamic factor model can be found in Forni et al. (2005)
8The estimation method, identification and impulse response are detailed in Ehrmann et al. (2003)
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In a Markov-switching VAR, with regime-dependence in the mean, variance and autoregressive parameters, a large
number of parameters can potentially switch between regimes. It is therefore often difficult to interpret the results of the
estimation of such systems. Such a problem of interpretation is similar to the interpretation of parameters in simple VAR
systems. Since the seminal work of Sims (1980), econometricians have traditionally imposed identifying restrictions on
the parameters estimates. They then derive a structural form of the model based on economic intuition. This approach
uses impulse response analysis in order to trace out how fundamental disturbances affect variables in the model. Ehrmann
et al. (2003) suggested imposing similar identifying restrictions on Markov-switching models. They propose using regime-
dependent impulse response functions in order to trace out how fundamental disturbances affect the variables in the model,
dependent on the regime. As a result, there is a set of impulse response functions for each regime. Such response functions
are conditional on a given regime prevailing at the time of the shock and throughout the duration of the response9. They
facilitate the interpretation of switching parameters by providing a convenient way to summarize the information contained
in the autoregressive parameters, variances and covariances of each regime. This approach combines Markov-switching
and identification in a two-stage procedure of estimation and identification. First, a Markov-switching unrestricted VAR
model is estimated, allowing means, intercepts, autoregressive parameters, variances and covariances to switch. Second, in
order to identify the system, one can impose restrictions on the parameter estimates to derive a separate structural form for
each regime, from which it is possible to compute the regime-dependent impulse response functions. Identification uses
the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix. The confidence intervals around the impulse responses are
computed by bootstrapping techniques (Ehrmann et al. (2003)).
5. Empirical Analysis
In the following, we report the results from the estimation of a MS-SFAVAR model on a data set including 3
sub-groups of factors, representing 3 economic concepts, and a monetary policy instrument. Our vector Xt contains 135
variables. Since we focus our empirical analysis on the quantitative easing period our sample spans the period between
1985 : 3 and 2006 : 03 at a monthly frequency. A full description of the database is provided in appendix B. The standard
method to evaluate monetary policy through a VAR model is to consider the uncollateralized overnight call interest rate as
the monetary policy instrument. In the special case of Japan, where interest rates were almost zero, this method cannot be
applied, because interest rates contained no more information concerning monetary policy. Theoretical work investigated
alternative variables, so-called intermediate variables, which are not directly controlled by the central bank. These variables
can be the long-term interest rate, the exchange rate, the interest rate spread and a monetary policy proxy (Kamada and
Sugo (2006)). Nevertheless, intermediate variables can be inconvenient as far as they can react to their own shocks, thereby
complicating the identification of monetary policy shocks. In this paper, we use the monetary base10 as the monetary policy
instrument to measure the effects of the quantitative easing policy in Japan. The monetary base thus represents the only
observed factor included in Yt .
5.1. Estimated Structural Factors
Since subsets of similar variables are considered to extract factors, the comovement observed in these
macroeconomic time series should be strong. A small number of factors therefore account for a relevant percentage of
9As shown by Ehrmann et al. (2003) regimes predicted by the transmission matrix must be highly persistent in order to have useful regime dependent
impulse functions.
10The seasonally adjusted M0 was corrected for the Y2K effect related to the temporary surge in liquidity demand in December 1999 and January
2000. As argued in Juselius (2006) transitory shocks in the model generate residual autocorrelations and violate the independence assumption of the VAR
model. As the Y2K effect appears as additive outliers we removed it by estimating an ARMA model with transitory intervention dummies (see figure A.2
in appendix A.)
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Table 1. Eigenvalues and percent of variance of first four factors
Activity factors
F1a F2 F3 F4
Eigenvalue 1.73 1.12 0.23 0.14
Percent variance 34.04 8.44 4.87 4.02
Price factors
Eigenvalue 2.04 0.87 0.57 .34
Percent variance 59.39 21.52 9.63 5.85
Interest rate factors
Eigenvalue 2.37 0.76 0.43 0.32
Percent variance 97.18 1.36 0.62 0.27
aFi,(i= 1...4) denotes i –th factor.
the overall panel variance. The first obvious check of the fit of our factor model is to see how well each factor represents
each sub-group of data series. In particular we examine the assumption according to which every sub-group is represented
by only one factor. Following Bernanke et al. (2005)and Belviso and Milani (2006), the number of static and dynamic
factors are determined in an ad hoc way. The statistic criterion, using the percentage of the variance of the panel accounted
for by common factors, describes comovements among series but does not determine the number of factors to include in the
MS-FAVAR model. In addition, the number of parameters to estimate in the models depends on the number of variables,
lags and states and can quickly be explosive. We then extract one factor from each sub-group in order to employ the more
parsimonious system. Table 1 gives the results on the relative importance of the first four factors in explaining the variance
of all variables. The first factor explains about 34, 59 and 97 percent of the data variability respectively for activity, prices,
and interest rates. Even when an additional factor is added, there is relatively little gain in the share of variance explained.
This confirms the robustness of our assumption considering only one factor for each sub-group. Figure A.1 illustrates the
estimated loadings plotted as bar charts for each factor. The numbers on the horizontal axis refer to the ordering of the
series of each subgroup and the factor loadings are on the vertical axis. The interest rate factor loadings are high (0.6 or
higher), while price and activity factor loadings have a lower level for some variables. This is due to the fact that activity
and price variables are more heterogeneous than interest rates. Nonetheless, it appears that all variables are involved in
constructing the factors since loadings are spread across all series. Furthermore, Figures C.1, C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C
show that cumulative factors clearly represent the corresponding variables in level.
5.2. Traditional MS-VAR
We first evaluate Japanese monetary policy using the MS-VAR model following Fujiwara (2006) with four
observed variables namely output y, the price level p, the money stock m and the 10-years JGB yields l, but using a longer
sample. First and foremost, we need to determine the optimum number of regimes to characterize the behavior of the time
series studied. Second, the best specification among various MS-VAR models has to be determined.
We tested for linearity by taking the linear model as the null hypothesis (there is a single regime) and the two-
regime-switching model as the alternative. In this case the usual tests, namely LR tests, LM and Walds tests, cannot be
conducted since the nuisance parameter is identified only under the alternative. The problem of statistical inference when
the nuisance parameters are unidentified under the null hypothesis has frequently been addressed. Hansen (1992) and
Garcia (1998) propose a non-standard likelihood ratio test (NSLR) which is calculated as a correction on the p-value of
a standard likelihood ratio test. However, this method does not give exact critical values but only a lower bound for the
limiting distribution of a standard LR statistic and is not developed for VAR models but for a univariate process. Since the
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null parameter space contains only two subsets, Cho and White (2007) show that the NSLR test is not valid if boundary
conditions are ignored. Moreover, Cho and White (2007)’s test (QLR) is only applicable on specific models which do
not include the MSVAR. In this paper we therefore use other tests like the Log-likelihood or information criteria. The
null hypothesis can easily be rejected as shown in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Moreover, the plots11 of the nonlinear model
estimation residuals indicate the absence of residual autoregression and almost all of the standardized residuals fall within
two standard deviations of a zero mean. The two-regime model is therefore supported.
Next, the best specification among variousMS-VARmodels has to be identified. In this case the LR test suggested by
Krolzig (1997) can be performed without causing problems. The alternative hypothesis MSIAH-VAR specification, where
all parameters switch between regimes, is tested against the other possible specifications. We then test the hypothesis of no
regime dependence in the variance–covariance matrix (MSIA-VAR), in autoregressive terms (MSIH-VAR) and in both the
variance–covariance matrix and autoregressive terms (MSI-VAR) for different lags.
The likelihood ratio test (Appendix D, TableD.2) suggests that an MSIAH-VAR model better fits the data than other
MSI-VAR specifications for two and three lags. Consequently, this study applies the Markov switching MSIAH-VAR
model in which intercepts, autoregressive terms and variance-covariance matrices are allowed to switch between regimes.
The lag length of two is chosen in order to have serially-uncorrelated residuals. This lag length is supported by AIC and
HQ criteria (Appendix D, TableD.3). Moreover, according to Table D.4 in Appendix D, showing the transition matrix,
the two-regimes are highly persistent. Regime dependent impulse responses are therefore an useful tool to analyze the
monetary policy of Japan. Figure 2 plots smoothed regime probabilities. The Japanese economy was in regime one up to
Figure 2. Regime probabilities for MSIAH-VAR
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1997 and has been in regime two since then, with an advanced warning in 1997 and early 1998. This result is similar to
that of Fujiwara (2006); the 2000 break date coincides neither with the beginning of ZIRP or QEMP, but lies in-between..
The stylized facts on the effects of an expansionary monetary base shock were established by Christiano et al. (1998),
using impulse response functions. They conclude that plausible models of the transmission mechanism of a monetary
11Plots are not reported here in order to conserve space and are available upon request from authors.
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expansion should be consistent at least with the following evidence on price, output and interest rate : i) the aggregate price
level initially responds very little, ii) output initially rises, with an inverted j-shaped response, with a zero long-run effect
of the monetary impulse, and iii) interest rates initially fall. Figure 3 presents the impulse response functions to a positive
Figure 3. Response to a monetary base shock in MS-VAR, regime 1 (left) and regime 2 (right).
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Note: The impulse reaction period is chosen to be 5 years. Solid lines show impulse responses, while dotted lines
represent confidence intervals using the 10th and 90th percentile values calculated on the basis of 999 bootstrap
replications. We refer to Davidson and MacKinnon (2001) who considered the problem of choosing the number of
bootstrap replications.
shock on the monetary base. Over the 1985-2000 period points i) and iii) are almost matched, while understandably, ii)
does not hold. The non-neutrality of money and the divergence of prices after a shock on the monetary base are striking.
Indeed, output responds immediately in a persistent way, while adjustment in prices takes more than twice as long. The
2000-2006 regime is characterized by insignificant effects of monetary base shocks on output and no price response.
Evaluating the reaction of interest rates reveals important results. In regime one the response of the interest rate is negative
but insignificant. In the regime two the reaction of bond yields is more substantial but remains insignificant. A look at
the interest-rates reaction reveals that policy-duration and signaling effects could affect prices in the expected way, even
though they remain weak. There is thus little evidence that the transmission mechanism of Japanese monetary policy at a
time of near-zero interest rates would work essentially through the effects on the term-structure of interest rates.
5.3. MS-SFAVAR
In the following, we present the estimated effects of the QEMP within the aforementioned specifications
of model 4.5. Since we identify monetary shocks by using the Cholesky decomposition, the factor ordering must be
determined carefully. The interest rate factor includes several long-term rates that contain expectations on the economy.
Because the monetary authorities can react only to the current state of the economy, the interest rate factor is ordered after
the monetary base. We consider therefore the following ordering of factors : real activity factor, prices factor, monetary
base and interest rate factors. Information criteria (Appendix E, TableE.1) suggest that the model is non-linear.
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From table E.2 and table E.3 in Appendix E, an MSIAH-SFAVAR specification is suggested by the LR test and the
lag length supported by two information criteria is two. The transition matrix (Appendix E, Table E.4) implies that the
regimes are highly persistent. As shown in Figure 4, the change in regime occurred in two steps: it first appeared in May
1996 and established itself durably in February 1999. Regime two thus corresponds precisely with the beginning of the
non-conventional monetary policy strategy namely the ZIRP consolidated by the QEMP.
Figure 4. Regime probabilities for MS-SFAVAR
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Figure 5 shows that, unlike in a classical MS-VAR, the stylized facts aforementioned are verified in all points in both
regimes. By contrast with Fujiwara (2006), Kamada and Sugo (2006) and Kimura, Kobayashi, Muranaga and Ugai (2003)
we detect a positive and significant effect on real activity even in the second regime under QEMP. In the pre-1996 regime,
the response of the output factor is moderate and short lived, while the response of the price factor is half as large, as quick,
but hardly significant. Under the second regime, after its initial rise the monetary base subsequently falls smoothly towards
its initial level; within eight months approximately half of the initial innovation has disappeared. The response of the output
factor is three times as large as under the first regime, and fifty percent longer-lived. The 90% confidence interval indicates
that the effect lasts significantly for thirteen months. The peak increase is found within 6 months. The monetary shock is
equivalent to a 1% increase in the monetary base. For reference, the total stock of CABs was about 4.6 trillion yen in the
beginning of regime two, so an increase of 1% would represent 46 billion yen. It leads to an increase of real activity by
about 0.15%, 0.1% after six months and one year, respectively. Even though this effect becomes insignificant at the end
of the first year it shows that a passive monetary policy would make the recession more severe. Therefore, the quantitative
easing would have at least prevented a further fall in output. Moreover, The magnitude and duration of this estimated effect
seem small in absolute terms. However, the considerable successive increases in CABs, by 25%, 20%, 100% and so on,
would have caused a sizable rise in Japan’s activity respectively by about 3.75%, 3% and 15% after six months. However,
the response of output remains short-lived, it veers to be insignificant from the end of the first year. The response of the
price factor, while slightly smaller is much longer-lived (up to nine months) than under the pre-1996 regime. The impulse
responses indicate that a 1% increase in the monetary base results in a cumulative 0.05% rise in prices over 5 years. As
compared to the standard MS-VAR, it is possible to see the contribution of the information contained in the factors and it
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Figure 5. Response to a monetary base shock in MS-SFAVAR
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Note: The impulse reaction period is chosen to be 5 years. Solid lines show impulse responses, while dotted lines
represent confidence intervals using the 10th and 90th percentile values calculated on the basis of 999 bootstrap
replications.
is then noteworthy that the non-neutrality of money and the price divergence in the pre-1996 regime, which characterized
the MS-VAR model, disappear with the MS-FAVAR. From the viewpoint of the liquidity premium, the significance of the
output effect tends to imply that, at near-zero interest rates, base money and financial assets are not perfect substitutes.
Portfolio rebalancing could therefore stimulate the economy. In other words, an increase in the monetary base reduces the
liquidity premium and leads economic agents to adjust their portfolios away from the monetary base to financial assets,
stimulating investment. The positive effect on prices is more substantial in regime one than in regime two. Policy-duration
and signaling effects seem to be stronger on short to medium-term interest rates in regime two than under regime one.
The decline in the interest rate factor becomes significant with a delay of one year. However, the positive effect of this
expectation channel remains small since the response of the interest rate factor veers to be insignificant from the beginning
of the second year.
In summary, our results indicate that the quantitative easing policy not only prevented further recession and deflation
but also had a relevant role stimulating real activity and prices in the short to medium run.
6. Robustness
Our results are based on the four variables which are arranged in order of output, price, monetary base and long
term interest rate. To check the robustness of the reported results, we estimated two additional types of models, price-
output–monetary base–bond yields and output–price–monetary base. The three variables model was previously estimated
by Fujiwara (2006). Neither the change in the ordering of variables (and factors) nor the exclusion of bond yields change the
dominance of the MSIAH-VAR specification. The timing of regime change in the model price-output–monetary base–bond
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yields is similar to that found in the model reported here. However, the exclusion of bond yields (and interest rate factor)
changed the timing of regimes for both the MS-VAR and MS-SFAVAR but not in a significant way. The results obtained
from all models are qualitatively similar to the results presented in the previous section. Under the traditional MS-VAR
all models indicate that the output and price reactions to a positive shock on the monetary base are positive and significant
during regime one. The effectiveness of monetary base shocks greatly diminishes during the second regime. In the MS-
SFAVAR the additional models confirm our basic finding that monetary base shocks still have a positive effect on output and
price even during the second regime. Moreover, we applied the method proposed by Stock and Watson (2002) to estimate
static factors. The results obtained from the MS-SFAVAR using these factors are very similar to those of using Forni et al.
(2005) methodology. Thus, our basic findings remain unaltered even if we include static factors in the estimation.
7. Implications and Discussion
The attempt to fight the effects of the global crisis generated by a credit boom built around the subprime-bubble
has led most major central banks to rely covertly or overtly on quantitative easing. In January 200912 the Fed explicitly
announced the adoption of quantitative easing. In order to draw lessons from the unique experience of quantitative easing
in Japan, a comparison between the quantitative easing programs implemented by the Fed and the BOJ is useful. Differ-
ences between the two experiences can be classified into two categories: those that are related to the preconditions for
implementation and those that are related to the implementation of the quantitative easing itself.
With respect to preconditions, the Japanese experience demonstrates that quantitative easing should be seen as a
symptomatic treatment which stimulates activity and prices. It was preceded by a treatment that addressed the cause of the
problems of the Japanese economy and it is note-worthy that the quantitative easing policy was adopted in Japan after a
dramatic change in the financial framework dealing with financial distress. Cargill et al. (2000) investigate changes in the
Japanese financial system and the BOJ’s evolution since the early nineties. They argue that the smooth implementation of
the big-bang announcements succeeded in establishing an infrastructure13 for the resolution of bank failures. These change
in the regulatory environment were combined by a commitment of 60 trillion yens (roughly 460 billion US$) to clean up
banks’ balance sheets. This has not been completely achieved yet for the American and European financial systems. In
addition, the US Department of Treasury announced only 30 billion US$ to remove ‘toxic’ assets from banks’ balance
sheets, an intervention which seems insufficient, considering the size of the current crisis and the Japanese experience.
As regards the implementation itself, the BOJ and the Fed used different approaches. One principal difference is
related to the timing; it took 10 years after the bubble burst in Japan to take on quantitative easing, while the Fed rapidly
adopted this strategy, just one year after the USA entered into financial crisis in 2007. The Fed therefore was more reactive.
The second difference concerns the total amount of CABs devoted to this strategy. After only one year the increase in the
reserves held by banks with the Fed, roughly 8% of GDP, now exceeds the level reached by those with the BOJ during the
five years of quantitative easing, between 2001 and 2006 (6% of GDP). The BOJ had also a commitment to a clear numerical
target for inflation and a fixed 5-year timetable. In contrast, the Fed prefered flexibility. This left out the advantage of a
clear commitment which reduces uncertainties and allows for better control of inflation expectations.
To continue the comparison, the US and Japanese experiences have one aspect in common: the currency carry trade.
The carry trade strategies consist of investing at short-term horizons by borrowing funds from banks in a low-interest rate
currency and investing it in a currency with higher interest rate. The foreign offices of American global banks account for
12The Fed has boosted its balance sheet to US$ 2.04 trillion from US$ 946 billion in September 2008. For more details see “Credit and Liquidity
Programs and the Balance Sheet”.
13The establishment of the Financial Supervisory Agency and the Financial Reconstruction committee in June and October 1998 respectively should
provide more transparent reporting of nonperforming loans and more direct control over managing the financial crisis.
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most of the yen carry trade (Hattori and Shin (2007)). Between 2004 and 2006, when the Fed raised its interest rates, the
Japan branches of foreign banks lent yens to their branches outside Japan to take advantage of low Japanese interest rates
and thus higher returns. During the current crisis, the Fed has encountered the dollar carry trade. This carry strategy might
have an impact on the transmission mechanism of quantitative easing.
This comparison is even more important now that the Fed is discussing exit strategies. One issue involves choosing
between increasing either short-term or long term interest rates. Assuming the fed raises short-term rates, it would face the
decision of whether or not to reduce the excess reserves in the banking system. If the decision were taken to reduce excess
reserves, the magnitude and timing of such a reduction would need to be considered. A similar debate occurred within the
BOJ in late 2004, at the end of the series of increases in the CABs. The BOJ chose raising short-term rate in the end of
quantitative program while CABs were being sharply reduced prior to this.
Moreover, the Japanese experience suggests that efforts to clean up bank’s balance sheets significantly improved
the effectiveness of quantitative easing. However, this effect, although considerable, is short-lived; it turns insignificant
after one year. The short duration of this effect should be borne in mind by the fed, which has already been conducting
its quantitative easing for one year. Indeed, the benefits of quantitative easing could still be exploited although they might
not last long, motivating a continuation of liquidity creation by the Fed, possibly with caution. In the light of the Japanese
experience, we argue that, in spite of the immediate reaction and the huge amount of CABs employed, which may help
solve short-term liquidity pressures in the financial system, the Fed would be better off postponing its exit from quantitative
easing. This should be decided according to a clear timetable and clear numerical objectives, not only about GDP’s growth
rate but also related to the preconditions discussed above. Quantitative easing is no substitute for efforts to restore the
financial system to health. This would allow the Fed to better control the private sector inflation expectations and deal with
the origin of this crisis.
8. Conclusion
During the Great Stagnation in Japan, academic economists almost unanimously recommended that, under a liquid-
ity trap, the only way for monetary authorities to try to revive the economy was to force-feed banks with base money. In this
paper we propose an SFAVAR approach combined with a Markov-Switching method in order to analyze the effectiveness
of this Japanese monetary policy. We implement a two-step approach. First, structural factors are estimated from subset
databases representing different economic concepts. Second, a Markov-switching model is estimated.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this work. First, we show for the first time that when the Bank of Japan
did start to follow this advice, through its quantitative easing policy, this strategy was effective in reviving output and price
inflation. However, the effect of quantitative easing is short-lived: it lasts only one year. This transient effect, even when
sizable, bears out the hypothesis that quantitative easing must be seen as a symptomatic treatment. Recession and deflation
are the symptoms and not the sources of the disease of the Japanese economy. Therefore quantitative easing needs to be
coupled with the necessary restructuring in the financial system. Our results contrast with almost all available empirical
evidence on the effects of this policy. The contrast does not stem from our use of regime-switching analysis, but rather from
our use of factor analysis in order to account for the myriad of variables which may have been interacting under this new
monetary policy of the BOJ. Second, in contrast to the MS-VAR approach, our MS-SFAVAR allowed us to detect changes
in monetary policy mechanisms in a reliable way; structural change occurred in February 1999 after a period of transition
starting in May 1995. In addition, our results show that the non-neutrality of money and the price divergence in the
pre-1995 regime, which characterized the MS-VAR model, disappear with the MS-SFAVAR. Results presented here thus
confirm the idea that exploiting a larger and more realistic information set proves a more reliable way to model monetary
policy behavior. Our conclusion is that quantitative easing, coupled with financial reforms could have positive effects on
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the economy. However, the Japanese experience suggests that we should not expect quantitative easing to deal with this
serious crisis in the short term, since it takes time to prove its effectiveness.
In future work, we plan to use this approach to investigate in detail the transmission mechanisms of Japanese
monetary policy. The Interest rate factor seems to be operative and responsible for monetary policy influence. However,
this factor can be affected both by=the expectation and the portfolio rebalancing channels suggested by the QEMP. It will
therefore be interesting to determine to what degree each factor affects every transmission channel. On the other hand,
we did not consider the international mechanism of monetary policy transmission. Our future research will also focus on
examining the implication of the currency carry trade strategies on the effectiveness of quantitative easing.
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Appendices
A. - Factor loadings
Figure A.1. Estimated factor loadings
Note: The loadings are spread across many series. The numbers on the horizontal axis refer to the ordering of the series of each
subgroup and correlations between the variables and the first factors (factor loadings) are on the vertical axis.
Figure A.2. The original and corrected M0
Source: Bank of Japan
Note: The monetary base (M0) is corrected for the Y2K effect when the BOJ had provided an exceptionally large
amount of funds in the market.
B. - Data description
Table B.1. Variable list
Data are extracted from Reuters EcoWin database. The transformation codes (T) are: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first
difference; 4 – logarithm; 5 – first difference of logarithm.
N◦ Description T
Real activity factor
1 Industrial Production Total Index 5
2 Production, Capital goods, SA, Index 5
3 Production, Ceramics, stone and clay products, SA, Index 5
4 Production, Chemicals, SA, Index 5
5 Production, Construction goods, SA, Index 5
6 Production, Consumer goods, SA, Index 5
7 Production, Domestic vehicle, total 5
8 Production, Durable consumer goods, SA, Index 5
9 Production, Fabricated metals, SA, Index 5
10 Production, Food and tobacco, SA, Index 5
11 Production, General machinery, SA, Index 5
12 Production, Iron and steel, SA, Index 5
13 Production, Manufacturing, SA, Index 5
14 Production, Mining and manufacturing, SA, Index 5
15 Production, Non-durable consumer goods, SA, Index 5
16 Production, Non-ferrous metals, SA, Index 5
17 Production, Other manufacturing, SA, Index 5
18 Production, Petroleum and coal products, SA, Index 5
19 Production, Plastic products, SA, Index 5
20 Production, Precision instruments, SA, Index 5
21 Production, Producer goods, SA, Index 5
22 Production, Pulp, paper and paper products, SA, Index 5
23 Production, Semiconductor devices, SA, Index 5
24 Production, Textiles, SA, Index 5
25 Production, Transport equipment, SA, Index 5
26 Shipments, Capital goods excl transport equipment, SA, Index 5
27 Shipments, Capital goods, SA, Index 5
28 Shipments, Construction goods, SA, Index 5
29 Shipments, Consumer goods, SA, Index 5
30 Shipments, Durable consumer goods, SA, Index 5
31 Shipments, Mining and manufacturing, Index 5
32 Shipments, Mining and manufacturing, Index 5
33 Shipments, Non-durable consumer goods, Index 5
34 Shipments, Producer goods total, Index 5
35 Shipments, Producer goods, for mining and manufacturing, Index 5
36 Shipments, Producer goods, for others, Index 5
37 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Fabricated metals, Index 5
38 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, General machinery, Index 5
39 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Iron and steel, Index 5
40 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Machinery industry, Index 5
41 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Manufacturing excluding machinery industry, Index 5
42 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Manufacturing, Index 5
43 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Petroleum and coal products, Index 5
44 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Pulp, paper and paper products, Index 5
45 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Textiles, Index 5
46 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Petroleum chemicals products, Index 5
47 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Rubber products, Index 5
48 Capacity Utilization, Operation Ratio, Transport equipment, Index 5
49 Hours Worked, Average Per Month, Electricity, gas, heat and water 1
50 Hours Worked, Average Per Month, Manufacturing 1
51 Hours Worked, Average Per Month, Mining 1
52 Unemployment, Rate 1
53 Labour Productivity, Foodstuff and tobacco (30 employees or more), Index 5
54 Labour Productivity, Furniture (30 employees or more), Index 5
55 Labour Productivity, Manufacturing (30 employees or more), Index 5
56 Labour Productivity, Textiles (30 employees or more), Index 5
57 Employment, Overall, Total 5
58 Sales at Deapartement Stores (Total) 5
59 Wholesale Trade, Food and beverages, JPY 5
60 Wholesale Trade, Furniture and house furnishing, JPY 5
61 Wholesale Trade, General merchandise, JPY 5
62 Wholesale Trade, Machinery and equipment, JPY 5
63 Wholesale Trade, Minerals and metals, JPY 5
64 Wholesale Trade, Others, JPY 5
65 Wholesale Trade, Textiles, JPY 5
66
Wholesale Trade, Total, JPY 5
67 Housing Starts, Housing built for sale 4
68 Housing Starts, Private homes 4
69 Housing Starts, Rental homes 4
70 Housing Starts, Total 4
71 Inventory Mining and manufacturing, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
72 Inventory Construction goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
73 Inventory Capital goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
74 Inventory Durable consumer goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
75 Inventory Non-durable consumer goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
76 Inventory Consumer goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
77 Inventory Producer goods, Index 5
78 New Orders, Construction, State organizations 5
79 New Orders, Construction, Total, big 50 constructors 5
80 New Orders, Construction, Works abroad 5
81 New Orders, Construction, Works executed 5
82 New Orders, Construction, Works yet to be executed 5
83 New Orders, Machine Tools, Total demand 5
Price factor
84 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, All Items, General, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
85 Japan, Consumer Prices, Industrial products,All, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
86 Japan, Consumer Prices, Industrial products,Textile, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
87 Japan, Consumer Prices, Electricity, gas & water charges , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
88 Japan, Consumer Prices, Services , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
89 Japan, Consumer Prices, Durable goods , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
90 Japan, Consumer Prices, Non Durable goods , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
91 Japan, Consumer Prices, Food , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
92 Japan, Consumer Prices, Reading and Recreation , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
93 Japan, Consumer Prices, Reading and Recreation, Recreational durables , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
94 Japan, Consumer Prices, Reading and Recreation, Recreational goods , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
95 Japan, Consumer Prices, Reading and Recreation, Recreational Services , Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
96 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, Clothing and Footwear, Hats and caps, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
97 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, All Items, General excluding imputed rent, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
98 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, Miscellaneous Goods and Services, Durable goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
99 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, Transport, Private transportation, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
100 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, Transport, Public transportation, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
101 Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, Communication, Communication, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
102 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic demand products, nondurable consumer goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
103 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic demand products, total, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
104 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic, capital goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
105 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic, chemicals, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
106 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic, consumer goods, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
107 Japan, Corporate Goods Prices, Domestic, total, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
108 Japan, Corporate Service Prices, All items, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
109 Japan, Corporate Service Prices, Transportation, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
110 Japan, Corporate Service Prices, Finance and insurance, Index, JPY, 2000=100 5
Interest rate factor
111 Call Rates, Collateralized Overnight (a)/Average(b) 1
112 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks,Stock/Short-term Loans/City Banks 1
113 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Short-term Loans/Regional Banks 1
114 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Short-term Loans/Regional Banks II 1
115 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Long-term Loans/City Banks 1
116 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Long-term Loans/Regional Banks 1
117 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Long-term Loans/Regional Banks II 1
118 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Loans/Regional Banks II 1
119 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Discounts/Shinkin Banks 1
120 Average Contracted Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of Domestically Licensed Banks, Stock/Total/Shinkin Banks 1
121 (Discontinued)Average Interest Rates on Certificates of Deposit (New Issues)/Total (through February 2000) 1
122 (Discontinued)Average Interest Rates on Certificates of Deposit (New Issues)/60 days - 89 days (through February 2000) 1
123 Japan, Interbank Rates, BBA LIBOR, 3 Month, End of Period, JPY 1
124 Japan, Interbank Rates, Collateralized Overnight, Average, JPY 1
125 Japan, Treasury Bills, Bid, 3 Month, Yield, End of Period, JPY 1
126 Japan, Prime Rates, Discounts, Regional Banks II, End of Period, JPY 1
127 Japan, Prime Rates, Discounts, Regional Banks, End of Period, JPY 1
128 Japan, Prime Rates, Discounts, Shinkin Banks, End of Period, JPY 1
129 Japan, Prime Rates, Finance Corporations, Key Lending Rates, - 5 Year, End of Period, JPY 1
130 Japan, Prime Rates, Loans, City Banks, End of Period, JPY 1
131 Japan, Prime Rates, Prime Lending Rate, Long Term, End of Period, JPY 1
132 Japan, Prime Rates, Prime Lending Rate, Short Term, End of Period, JPY 1
133 Japan - Benchmark bond - Japan 10-year Government Benchmark bond yield - Yield, average of observations through period - Japanese yen 1
134 Government Bond Yield, 10 Year, Average 1
135 10-year interest-bearing Government Bonds 1
136 10-year Local Government Bonds 1
137 10-year Government Guaranteed Bonds 1
138 5-year interest-bearing Bank debentures 1
C. - Estimated factors
Figure C.1. Activity factor
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
Lrgdp 
Lconstgoods 
Ldurcongd 
LMiningmanuf 
Lcaputorch 
Lcaputormind 
Lcaputorfabm 
Lcaputormang 
Lcaputorpppp 
Lcaputortext 
Lcapital_goods 
Lconsgoods 
Lmanuf 
LNonduraconsgd 
Lcaputorccsp 
Lcaputorelecma 
Lcaputorgenm 
Lcaputornfmet 
Lcaputortrans 
cumfactivity 
Note: The real activity factor is estimated from the vector of all the 83 the real activity related variables. The bold line shows
the cumulative activity factor, while the doted lines represent simple variables in log level related to the real activity outlined
in table 2.
Figure C.2. Price factor
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Note: The price factor is estimated from the vector of all the 27 price related variables. The bold line shows the cumulative price
factor, while the doted lines represent price related variables, expressed in log level, described in table 2.
Figure C.3. Interest rate factor
Note: The interest rate factor is estimated from the vector of all the 28 interest rate related variables. The bold line shows the
cumulative interest rate factor, while the doted lines represent some interest rate related variables outlined in table 2.
D. - MS-VAR estimation results
Table D.1. Linearity test:VAR model
Lags IC Two regimesa single regime
Lag1
AIC -20.4985 -20.2435
HQ -20.3584 -20.0434
SC -19.7938 -19.6435
Lag2
AIC -20.4987 -20.2834
HQ -20.3402 -20.0345
SC -19.7058 -19.7003
Lag3
AIC -20.2358 -20.1348
HQ -19.8345 -19.7905
SC -19.3345 -19.3104
aFour variable MSVAR with output, price level, monetary base and
bond yield. All information criterion (values in bold font) for all number
of lags support the presence of regime shifts.
Table D.2. MS specifications among various MS-VAR models
IC MSIa(2) MSIA(2) MSIH(2) MSIAH(2)
Lag1
Log-L 2675.3495 2702.3459 2833.4954 2843.8345
Parameters 36 52 46 62
LR testb 336.97 282.9772 20.6782 -
χ2(R) 38.885 18.307 26.296 -
Lag2
Log-L 2683.8454 2738.3245 2826,3455 2860.3432
Parameters 52 84 62 94
LR test 353.9894 244.0374 67.9954 -
χ2(R) 58.124 18.307 46.194 -
Lag3
Log-L 2686.3485 2740.3428 2846.4328 2888.2394
Parameters 68 116 78 126
LR test 403.7818 295.7932 83.6132 -
χ2(R) 76.778 18.307 65.171 -
a According to Krolzig’s notation, MSI means that only intercepts are assumed to switch be-
tween regimes, MSIA means that intercepts and coefficients are assumed to switch, MSIH means
that intercepts and variance covariance matrices are assumed to switch and MSIAH means that all
the parameters are assumed to switch.
bAll the calculated values of Likelihood Ratio test, except for lag = 2, are greater than Chi2
tabulated values. All the specifications are thus outperformed by the MSIAH.
Table D.3. Lag length test:MSIAH-VAR model
AICa HQ BC
Lag = 1 -21.3490 -20.5238 -20.3475
Lag = 2 -21.2348 -20.2398 -19.5379
Lag = 3 -21.4473 -20.4384 -19.4348
aThe lag length supported by AIC and HQ (values in bold
font) is two.
Table D.4. Transition matrix
Regime 1a Regime 2
Regime 1 0.9227 0.0773
Regime 2 0.0563 0.9437
aNote that pi, j = Pr(st+1 = j|st = i)
E. - MS-FAVAR estimation results
Table E.1. Linearity test: MS-FAVAR
Lags IC Two regimesa Linear FAVARb
Lag1
AIC -24.2349 -23.5437
HQ -23.8645 -23.5889
SC -23.5984 -23.4787
Lag2
AIC -24.4375 -24.4048
HQ -24.1653 -24.1648
SC -23.7375 -23.7861
Lag3
AIC -24.4348 -24.3904
HQ -24.0849 -24.0394
SC -23.5103 -23.4938
aThe presence of two regimes is supported by all the infor-
mation criterion for all number of lags except SC criteria for
two lags.
bThe four variables MS-FAVAR consist of real activity,
price and interest rate factors and monetary base.
Table E.2. MS specifications among various MS-FAVAR model
IC MSI(2) MSIA MSIH MSIAH
Lag1
Log-L 3123.5672 3145.2763 3239.2340 3254.1346
Parameters 36 52 46 62
LR testa 261.1348 217.7166 29,8012 -
χ2(R) 38.885 18.307 26.296 -
Lag2
Log-L 3167.3458 3243.5745 3345.9074 3354.3409
Parameters 52 84 62 94
LR test 304.2359 256.4347 57.4375 -
χ2(R) 58.124 18.307 46.194 -
Lag3
Log-L 3164.3341 3222.7817 3328.0644 3372.5083
Parameters 68 116 78 126
LR test 416.3484 299.4532 88.8878 -
χ2(R) 76.778 18.307 65.171 -
aSince Likelihood Ratio statistic values are greater than Chi2 tabulated values, the null hypoth-
esis of linearity is rejected. MSIAH FAVAR specification is thus supported to perform better the
data.
Table E.3. Lag length test:MSIAH-FAVAR model
AIC HQ BC
Lag = 1 -25.2042 -24.3240 -24.2305
Lag = 2 -25.4534 -25.3941 -24.4375
Lag = 3a -25.4649 -24.3485 -23.3458
aThis lag length is supported by only AIC.
Table E.4. Transition matrix
Regime 1a Regime 2
Regime 1 0.9517 0.0483
Regime 2 0.0671 0.9329
aNote that pi, j = Pr(st+1 = j|st = i)
F. - VECM estimation results
Before estimating a VAR in level, we explored the possibility of using a VECM14. We started by testing for the number
of cointegrating relationships in the system and estimating the long run relations. Juselius (2004) recommends that the
stationarity tests on any single time series should be conducted with a chi-square-distributed likelihood ratio statistic. This
should be done within a modeled system that is restricted for rank. Juselius cautions against using univariate tests such
as the Dickey-Fuller tests, because she argues that the (non)stationarity of a series is not independent of the rank of the
error-correction terms.
Following Nielsen (2004) and Juselius (2004) we first examined the plotted15 logged levels, except for the interest
rate, and first difference of the data. There is no mean reversion and the examination of first-differenced data suggests
that there are a number of observation-specific non-normal “outliers” effects. Therefore the specification includes a linear
trend, and a number of various appropriately specified observation-specific dummy variables to account for outliers. Then
the unrestricted VAR in levels, denoting a VAR model in logged levels, was estimated with a restricted trend and three
lags. The standard misspecification tests showed that the residuals were not well behaved. The multivariate normality test
strongly rejected the null hypothesis of normality.
We followed a procedure for the examination and analysis of potential outliers recommended by Juselius (2004)
and Nielsen (2004). An observation is considered an “outlier” if it generates a standardized residual with an absolute
value which should be larger than 3.6 given our sample size. Looking at the standardized residuals there are no outliers
in the industrial production variable. Outliers in the consumer price index are present on: 1989:04 (+3.7), 1989:11 (-3,2)
and 1997:04 (+6.8). In the monetary base variable the outliers are on: 1999:12, 2000:01, 2000:02 and 2006:04 . The
government bond yields show outliers on 1998:10 (-3.7), 1998:12 (+4.5), 2003:06 and 2003:08. Outliers which can be
explained by economic events are:
• 1989:04 : the consumption tax and the consumption Tax Law took effect from 1 April 1989. There is a dramatic
change in slope of the price variable starting on this date. We can consider this outlier as permanent. Specification
considerations include a permanent shift variable for the post 1998:04 part of the sample.
14 OxMetrics and the econometrics package CATS in Rats are used the VECM analysis.
15Plots are not reported here in order to conserve space
• 1997:04 : Prime Minister Hashimoto decided to increase the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent and to put an end to
temporary income tax cuts. Specification considerations include an impulse dummy variable to allow for the shock
caused by this intervention.
• 1998:10 : corresponds to a sharp decline in 10-year yields generated by the Russian crisis which led to flight to
quality and pulled down the term premium. This event seems to have been temporary and a blip dummy variable
included in the short run deterministic component is specified for this event.
• 1998:12 : the sharp increase in 10-year yields reflects an increase in the public debt; Moody’s reduced Japan’s debt
rating from its highest Aaa to Aa1 on November 17, 1998. This increase can also be explained by the announcement
by the Trust Fund Bureau that it would stop outright purchases of government bonds in December 1998.
• In 2001:9 there is a permanent shift asociated with an important decision taken by the BOJ: a change in the guideline
for monetary market operations; CAB rose from 5 to 6 trillion yen. At the same date there was an increase in outright
purchases of long-term government bonds, from 400 billion to 600 billion yen per month.
• Outliers which are present on 1999:12, 2001:01 and 2000:2 correspond to the provision of extra liquidity by the BOJ
to deal with the potential Year 2000-related problems. As such outliers are of opposite signs they are considered as
transitory effects of a shock (+4, +3 and −7).
• 2006:04 corresponds to the end of QEPM (the effect seems to start here rather than in 2006:03).
Permanent shift dummies were restricted to the cointegrating space to allow for the possibility that the events may
have had a permanent effect. However, outliers which do not correspond to an economic event and which seem to be due
to transitory effects of shocks or simple mistakes, are likely to be additive and should therefore not be modeled. Following
Nielsen (2004) we chose to leave the additive outliers in the data set. The inclusion of the shift, blip and transitory dummies
in an unrestricted VECM does improve the misspecification tests significantly but the multivariate normality test still rejects
the null hypothesis of normality. This is caused by the non-normality of the residuals of the monetary-base equation in spite
of major attempts to improve the specification (multivariate normality test value falling from a highly untenable 240.6 initial
value to 11.8). In the next step, to calculate the rank test statistics we used a simulated Bartlett test. This is because the
95 percent fractile values are adjusted for the restriction of permanent shift dummies included in the cointegration space
(Juselius 2004). The null hypothesis corrected for the shift dummies suggest that the null hypothesis of at least r = 0
is accepted. Hence the rank test statistics suggest that the system has no cointegrating relation and the four variables do
not share common trends. The same analysis was conducted for cumulated factors. Since the factors are estimated from
different subsets of variables they are not orthogonal to each other and can be cointegrated. In spite of the ability of factor
analysis to eliminate idiosyncratic shocks and therefore outliers from simple variables we cannot detect any long term
relationship between the factors and the monetary base.
